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GBS diagnostic code from the state-
wide hospital discharge database rep-
resenting acute GBS was only 30%. 
Of the 103 conﬁ  rmed cases, 26 (25%) 
would have been missed if only the 
state hospital discharge database was 
used to identify potential cases.
Of 103 cases, all were identi-
ﬁ  ed with ICD-9-CM diagnosis code 
357.0; in 91 (88%) cases, this was the 
primary diagnosis. Other combina-
tions of codes did not identify addi-
tional cases. Of cases of acute GBS 
identiﬁ  ed, 32 (30%) met only clinical 
criteria (Brighton Level 1), 40 (39%) 
had either laboratory or electrophysi-
ologic evidence (Brighton Level 2), 
and 32 (31%) had both (Brighton 
Level 3).
Because the 2 surveillance sys-
tems we compared both relied on 
medical record discharge diagnoses, 
they were not independent, and we 
could not perform a capture/recap-
ture analysis. Because GBS is a di-
agnosis for which the great majority 
of patients are hospitalized, and our 
overall incidence rate is within the 
range identiﬁ  ed in other studies, it is 
likely that the combination of these 
methods is reasonably sensitive. The 
administrative hospital discharge da-
tabase could not be relied on to con-
ﬁ  rm that all coded GBS cases were 
acute. Even if the 114 nonacute cases 
could easily have been identiﬁ  ed and 
excluded from the initial list of 344 
records, only 103 (45%) of the re-
maining 230 reports were identiﬁ  ed 
as conﬁ  rmed acute cases.
Although the use of large hospital 
discharge databases may be useful as 
an adjunct for identiﬁ  cation of GBS 
cases as part of public health surveil-
lance, they lack sufﬁ  cient sensitivity 
or speciﬁ   city to be relied upon ex-
clusively. The poor speciﬁ  city of the 
system is particularly problematic for 
public health surveillance. A large in-
vestment of time and resources was 
necessary to perform manual chart re-
views to conﬁ  rm possible cases, two-
thirds of which were ultimately found 
not to be cases at all. Statewide admin-
istrative hospital discharge diagnosis 
databases should not be solely relied 
on for GBS surveillance. Additional 
methods of reliable and efﬁ  cient as-
certainment and veriﬁ  cation of cases 
are crucial to ensure valid data. Ob-
taining reliable methods is particularly 
important for urgent situations such as 
current surveillance for adverse events 
after pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
vaccination, in which the detection of 
problems will have immediate public 
health effects.
Timothy F. Jones, 
Marcy McMillian, Efﬁ  e Boothe, 
Samir Hanna, 
and L. Amanda Ingram
Author afﬁ  liation: Tennessee Department of 
Health, Nashville, Tennessee, USA
DOI: 10.3201/eid1609.091837
References
  1.   Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion. Safety of inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) 2009 
monovalent vaccines—United States, 
October 1–November 24, 2009. MMWR 
Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2009;58:1–6.
    2.   Iskander J, Broder K. Monitoring the 
safety of annual and pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
vaccines: lessons from the US experience. 
Expert Rev Vaccines. 2008;7:75–82. DOI: 
10.1586/14760584.7.1.75
  3.   Iskander J, Haber P, Herrera G. Monitor-
ing vaccine safety during an inﬂ  uenza pan-
demic. Yale J Biol Med. 2005;78:265–75.
  4.   Haber P, DeStefano F, Angulo FJ, Iskander 
J, Shadomy SV, Weintraub E, et al. Guil-
lain-Barré syndrome following inﬂ  uenza 
vaccination. JAMA. 2004;292:2478–81. 
DOI: 10.1001/jama.292.20.2478
  5.   van Doorn PA, Ruts L, Jacobs BC. Clini-
cal features, pathogenesis, and treatment 
of Guillain-Barré syndrome. Lancet Neu-
rol. 2008;7:939–50. DOI: 10.1016/S1474-
4422(08)70215-1
    6.    McGrogan A, Madle GC, Seaman HE, 
de Vries CS. The epidemiology of 
Guillain-Barré syndrome worldwide. 
A systematic literature review. Neu-
roepidemiology. 2009;32:150–63. DOI: 
10.1159/000184748
  7.   Mullooly JP, Donahue JG, DeStefano F, 
Baggs J, Eriksen E. Predictive value of 
ICD-9-CM codes used in vaccine safety 
research. Methods Inf Med. 2008;47:328–
35.
  8.   France EK, Glanz JM, Xu S, Davis RL, 
Black SB, Shineﬁ   eld HR, et al. Safety 
of the trivalent inactivated inﬂ  uenza 
vaccine among children: a population-
based study. Arch Pediatr Adolesc 
Med. 2004;158:1031–6. DOI: 10.1001/
archpedi.158.11.1031
  9.   Bogliun G, Beghi E. Validity of hospital 
discharge diagnoses for public health sur-
veillance of the Guillain-Barré syndrome. 
Neurol Sci. 2002;23:113–7. DOI: 10.1007/
s100720200036
10.   Sejvar J, Kohl KS, Gidudu J, Amato A, 
Bakshi N, Baxter N, et al. Guillain-Barré 
syndrome and Fisher syndrome: case 
deﬁ   nition and guidelines for collection, 
analysis and presentation of immunization 
safety data. Atlanta: Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention; 2009 [cited 2010 
Apr 26]. http://www.brightoncollabora-
tion.org
Address for correspondence: Timothy F. Jones, 
Tennessee Department of Health CEDS, 1st 
Floor, CHB 425 5th Ave N, Nashville, TN 
37243, USA; email: tim.f.jones@tn.gov
Contact Lens 
Solution–associated 
Acanthamoeba and 
Fusarium Keratitis
To the Editor: Verani et al. (1) 
detailed the 2004–2007 outbreak of 
Acanthamoeba keratitis (AK) in per-
sons wearing soft contact lenses who 
used Complete MoisturePlus (CMP) 
multipurpose contact lens solution 
(Advanced Medical Optics, Santa 
Ana, CA, USA). They noted similari-
ties between the AK outbreak and the 
Fusarium keratitis (FK) outbreak of 
2004–2006, including the concomi-
tant time frame and association with a 
particular solution, ReNu with Mois-
tureLoc (Bausch & Lomb, Rochester, 
NY, USA). Both solutions were new 
products introduced within 1 year be-
fore the respective outbreaks.
In neither outbreak was the solu-
tion contaminated; in both outbreaks, 
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 9, September 2010  1501 LETTERS
implicated bottles were from multiple 
lots, suggesting that each outbreak 
resulted from insufﬁ  cient  antimi-
crobial activity. However, in the FK 
outbreak, all reported cases involved 
bottles produced at 1 (Greenville, 
SC, USA) of 4 multinational Bausch 
& Lomb manufacturing plants (2). 
After a Food and Drug Administra-
tion inspection of the Greenville fa-
cility, Bausch & Lomb was cited for 
inadequacies in temperature control 
during production, storage, and trans-
port of its products in and beyond the 
plant (3).
We experimentally demonstrat-
ed that, when exposed to prolonged 
temperature elevation, ReNu with 
MoistureLoc loses more in vitro 
fungistatic activity than do other 
contact lens solutions. We concluded 
that improper temperature control of 
ReNu with MoistureLoc may have 
contributed to the FK outbreak (4). 
We are aware of no other theory that 
adequately explains why only ReNu 
with MoistureLoc from only 1 plant 
was implicated.
CMP was manufactured and used 
internationally; AK has a much 
higher incidence in Europe and 
Hong Kong than in the United States 
(5), and CMP–associated AK has 
been reported internationally (6). 
Therefore, it would seem critical 
to know, and we would like the 
authors to comment on, whether 
the geographic pattern of the AK 
coincided with distribution of CMP 
solution from >1 Advanced Medical 
Optics manufacturing plants and, if 
so, the relevance of that information.
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In Response: We thank Bullock 
and Warwar for offering their theory 
of potential consequences of manu-
facturing inadequacies in temperature 
control during production of ReNu 
with MoistureLoc (Bausch & Lomb, 
Rochester, NY, USA) associated with 
the Fusarium keratitis (FK) outbreak 
during 2004–2006 (1). They note the 
substantial similarities between the 
FK outbreak and the Ancanthamoeba 
keratitis (AK) outbreak that we re-
ported (2). They inquire whether the 
geographic pattern of AK outbreak–
associated cases coincides with dis-
tribution of >1 manufacturing plants 
for the associated product, Complete 
MoisturePlus (CMP) multipurpose 
contact lens solution (Advanced Med-
ical Optics [AMO], Santa Ana, CA, 
USA).
We obtained lot numbers for 22 
bottles of CMP that AK case-patients 
used before symptom onset. Because 
no lot number was repeated, intrinsic 
contamination was unlikely as the 
source of the AK outbreak; the geo-
graphic and temporal distribution of 
cases further argued against a point-
source outbreak. All 17 lot numbers 
for which AMO plant of origin was de-
termined were manufactured in Spain 
(Food and Drug Administration, pers. 
comm.). According to a press release 
from AMO in November 2006, the 
“vast majority of AMO’s contact lens 
solution products distributed in the 
U.S.” were manufactured in the com-
pany’s production facility in Spain, 1 
of its 2 international manufacturing 
plants (3).
CMP was produced and used 
internationally at the time of the US 
multistate outbreak (4). Por and col-
leagues (5) reported an increase in the 
number of AK cases among contact 
lens users in Singapore that temporally 
coincided with the US outbreak. How-
ever, their retrospective case series 
did not include a control group; there-
fore, measuring associations between 
particular contact lens products and 
AK was not possible for those case-
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patients. The authors reported that 
a case–control study was underway, 
and we look forward to seeing the 
results of that investigation to better 
understand the magnitude of AK cases 
associated with CMP use.
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New Infectious 
Diseases and 
Industrial Food 
Animal Production
To the Editor: Cutler et al. bring 
welcome attention to the importance 
of new and reemerging zoonotic dis-
eases in the industrialized world (1). 
However, they make no mention of 
industrialized systems of food animal 
production, major sources of antimi-
crobial drug–resistant bacterial patho-
gens (2) that are among the most glob-
ally prevalent and emerging infectious 
diseases (3). These systems have prac-
tices characterized by crowded and 
unsanitary conﬁ  nement of animals and 
routine use of antimicrobial agents in 
animal feeds (2). For example, in the 
same issue, Dutil et al. (3) reported on 
increases in ceftiofur resistance in Sal-
monella enterica isolates from food, 
which they associate with use of this 
drug in broiler poultry production.
Recognition of the role of in-
dustrial food animal production in 
driving vancomycin resistance in 
enterococci prompted restrictions on 
agricultural antimicrobial drug use in 
the European Union; unfortunately, 
few measures have been implement-
ed in the rest of the world (including 
the United States) (4). Industrialized 
food animal production is now as-
sumed to contribute to the emergence 
of new strains of community-associ-
ated methicillin-resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus with varying potential 
for infecting humans (5). Because the 
industrial model of food animal pro-
duction is rapidly expanding globally 
(2), this source must be included in 
surveillance, research, and tracking 
programs for effective prevention of 
emerging zoonotic disease.
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